GAO Summarizes 2003-2007 Covert Tests of Border Security for Senate Finance Committee

(From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry - the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the U.S. In its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment work for these three testimonies.)

Covert Tests Involving Counterfeit IDs at Ports of Entry

In its 2003-2007 covert tests and security assessments, GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border locations between the ports of entry.

In testing ports of entry, undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the U.S. dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by boat, and by airplane.

Investigators attempted to enter in four states on the northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia).

In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93% success rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show identification.

As a result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of entry with little chance of being detected.

Covert Testing of Simulated Radioactive Smuggling, Other Contraband, Between Ports of Entry at Northern Border

GAO states that in its most recent work, it shifted its focus from ports of entry and primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored areas between ports of entry.

In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads that were very close to the border that U.S. Customs and Border Protection did not appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the U.S. from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO's activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the investigators and their simulated contraband.

Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the U.S. was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border.

GAO concluded that CBP faces significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the U.S. by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the assessed locations.

(See ITT's Online Archives or 04/26/06 news, 06042630, for BP summary of GAO testimony detailing an investigation in which investigators purchased and transported radioactive material across the northern and southern borders using forged documents.)

GAO Report (GAO-08-757, dated May 2008) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08757.pdf