GAO Reports that NRC, CBP Need to Take Additional Measures to Track and Detect Radioactive Materials

NRC Needs to Modify Licensing, Mitigation, Regulation of Radioactive Materials

GAO states that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has made limited progress toward implementing previous GAO recommendations to (1) modify its process for issuing licenses to ensure that radioactive materials cannot be purchased by those with no legitimate need for them, (2) determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of such materials, and (3) examine whether certain radioactive sources should be subject to more stringent regulations.

More specifically, although NRC did take steps in December 2006 that it thought would ensure that radioactive materials could not be purchased by those without a legitimate need for them, these changes were not sufficient to prevent GAO investigators from obtaining an NRC license for a fictitious business and using this license to obtain commitments from manufacturers of industrial devices containing radioactive materials to sell them to investigators.

NRC also has not yet taken steps to determine how to mitigate the potential psychological effects of a terrorist attack using radioactive materials, although it has participated in an interagency working group that recently produced a draft version of a public education action plan that seeks, among other things, to reduce public fears of radioactivity and diminish the impact of a terrorist attack using such materials.

Although NRC has gathered the data it needs to re-examine whether certain radioactive sources should be regulated through specific licenses rather than general licenses, it has only recently begun the process of deciding, in consultation with agreement states, whether and what sort of changes should be made. (Specific licenses are issued for devices that contain relatively larger radioactive sealed sources, and general licenses are issued for devices containing relatively small radioactive sources.)

CBP Needs More Radiation Detection, Verification of Licenses

GAO states that while U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has a comprehensive system in place to detect radioactive materials entering the U.S. at land borders, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply. Specifically, vehicles, cargo, and people entering the U.S. at most ports of entry along the Canadian and Mexican borders are scanned for radioactive materials with radiation detection equipment capable of detecting very small amounts of radiation. However, GAO found that personal radiation detectors are not available to all officers who need them.

GAO also reports that while CBP has systems in place to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials licenses, it has not effectively communicated to officers at the borders when they must contact officials to verify the license for a given sealed source. Consequently, some CBP officers are not following current guidance, and some potentially dangerous radioactive materials have entered the country without license verification.

¹The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs' Subcommittee on Investigations

(See ITT's Online Archives or 07/11/08 news, 08071120, for BP summary of a recent GAO report summarizing covert tests of border security from 2003-2007.

See ITT's Online Archives or 04/24/06 news, 06042420, for BP summary of a 2006 GAO report finding problems in the Department of Homeland Security's deployment of radiation detection equipment, verification of NRC licenses, etc.)

GAO Report (GAO-08-598, dated June 2008) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08598.pdf