Spectrum aggregation limits in Canada’s recent 700 MHz...

of T-Mobile. “The main lesson from the Canadian 700 MHz auction is that well-crafted spectrum-aggregation limits can succeed in encouraging valuable competition in the mobile industry without sacrificing auction revenues,” Cramton said (http://bit.ly/1gVIerq). “Were the Canadian auction conducted without limits, it seems likely that the regional operators would have been pushed aside by the much stronger Big 3.” Rogers “as a result of a network sharing arrangement between Bell and Telus had the most to lose if it failed to get” the A and B blocks, he said. “Rogers competed aggressively for AB and won in all the major markets paying CD$4.32 per MHz/POP, about twice the overall average auction price of CD$2.32. The C block also commanded a high price.” Like the Canadian market, the U.S. market is highly concentrated, Cramton said. “In the U.S., the Big 2 [carriers] have 67 percent market share and hold roughly 80 percent of the low-band spectrum, which is best-suited to providing coverage within buildings and in more difficult terrain. Were the Big 2 to dominate the 600 MHz auction, competition in the mobile broadband market would be harmed.” Also on spectrum aggregation, Verizon disputed arguments in a T-Mobile white paper, the T-Mobile USF Mobile Model Report (http://bit.ly/1efEsUX). “T-Mobile recently submitted a cost study analyzing deployment costs in rural markets for different types of spectrum,” Verizon said (http://bit.ly/1i85oqI). “That study provides no support for T-Mobile’s claim that it or any other firm is in danger of being ‘foreclosed’ from competing effectively in any market. The economic evidence shows there is no valid basis for the Commission to abandon its longstanding and successful policy of assigning spectrum to those firms that value it most and that will put it to use promptly to serve their customers."