House China Committee Leads Press FCC on Restricting Chinese-Made IoT Modules
House China Committee leaders pressed FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel Tuesday for information about the extent to which Chinese equipment manufacturers like Fibocom and Quectel are spying via U.S. IoT-connected devices via connectivity modules. Those “modules have the capacity both to…
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brick the device and to access the data flowing from the device to the web server that runs each device,” House China Chairman Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., and ranking member Raja Krishnamoorthi, D-Calif., said in a letter to Rosenworcel. If the Chinese government “can control the module, it may be able to effectively exfiltrate data or shut down the IoT device. This raises particularly grave concerns in the context of critical infrastructure and any type of sensitive data.” The lawmakers specifically cited Fibocom and Quectel because both gearmakers get “extensive state support” from the Chinese government that makes their equipment a surveillance vector. “The FCC has taken important steps to counter the nefarious influence of [Chinese Communist Party]-controlled technology in U.S. telecom networks, including” clamping down on use of gear from Huawei and ZTE on U.S. networks, Gallagher and Krishnamoorthi said: “There are still many U.S. and allied firms that compete with” Chinese “cellular IoT module providers -- such that restricting Quectel and Fibocom’s access to the U.S. market would not undermine U.S. telecommunications networks.” Tackling Chinese IoT modules “is a natural next step for the FCC, in consultation with appropriate national security agencies,” the lawmakers said. They asked Rosenworcel to tell them whether the FCC is “able to track the presence” of IoT modules on U.S. networks and whether the commission is considering addressing that equipment as part of its November order (see 2211230065) to prevent the sale of yet-to-be authorized equipment from Chinese companies in the U.S., among other matters.