Chevron Decision Doesn't Call for Review of Magnitsky Sanctions Under IEEPA, US Says
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright v. Raimondo rejecting the Chevron principle of deferring to federal agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes doesn't call for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to revisit a decision sustaining the sanctions designation of former Afghan government official Mir Rahman Rahmani and his son, Hafi Ajmal Rahmani, the U.S. said this week (Mir Rahman Rahmani v. Janet Yellen, D.D.C. # 24-00285).
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The Rahmanis recently argued that Loper Bright requires a review of whether the U.S. properly interpreted the Global Magnitsky Act in sanctioning them and 44 of their companies (see 2407190014). The pair said the Office of Foreign Assets Control's interpretation of who counts as "government officials" under the Global Magnitsky Act isn't due any deference.
In response, the U.S. said that, as the court already identified, the decision sanctioning the individuals references not only the Global Magnitsky Act but also the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. IEEPA provides an "independent and adequate basis for the sanctions," so it's irrelevant whether the designations were proper under the Global Magnitsky Act alone, the brief said. IEEPA unambiguously allows for the sanctions, barring the need for the court's interpretation under Loper Bright, the government said.
The U.S. also said the Rahmanis confused "the appropriate respect accorded to the political branches on matters of foreign policy and national security with deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes." The executive branch's foreign relations power in this context doesn't flow from "assumptions that Congress has left gaps in ambiguous statutes to be filled by agency expertise" established in Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking, the U.S. said.
Instead, deference to OFAC in this case "flows from separation-of-powers principles and a caution against judicial interference in foreign relations and national security matters, not Chevron."
As far as the executive's proper interpretation of IEEPA, that issue isn't before the court because the Rahmanis aren't challenging it, the brief said. In addition, Loper Bright said Chevron deference was improper because the APA says courts are to state what the law is as it pertains to ambiguous statutes. The president isn't an agency marred by the Loper Bright decision, the brief said.