Trade advocates and a trade scholar discussed how effective U.S.-Asia sectoral agreements could be, as well as the possible downsides of such agreements, during an Asia Society Policy Institute webinar Jan. 26. The Japan mini-deal was not exactly a sectoral deal because it lowered tariffs on a variety of products across different categories, but the agreement's digital trade plank is one that negotiators could consider as a template for a digital trade accord across more Asian countries.

CBP published notices in the Customs Bulletin revoking or modifying numerous rulings in 2020. These ruling revocations and modifications also apply to “any treatment previously accorded by CBP to substantially identical transactions.” When revoking or modifying a ruling, CBP is required by 19 USC 1625(c) to publish notice of the proposed action, and allow a period—generally one month—for comment before finalizing the action. An importer’s failure to advise CBP of “substantially identical transactions” or of a ruling not identified by CBP in these notices “may raise issues of reasonable care on the part of the importer or its agents for importations of merchandise subsequent to the effective date of this notice.” Rulings CBP revoked or modified in 2020 are as follows:

The following lawsuits were filed at the Court of International Trade during the week of Dec. 21-27:

New licensing requirements for aluminum products are now set to begin Jan. 25, 2021, under a Commerce Department final rule creating a new Aluminum Import Monitoring and Analysis System. Similar to the Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System in place since 2005, the new scheme requires importers of aluminum or their customs brokers to submit information in an online portal to obtain an automatically issued license, then submit the license number with entry summary documentation.

The following lawsuits were filed at the Court of International Trade during the week of Nov. 23-29:

The U.S. Trade Representative announced that Mexico “will establish a strict monitoring regime for exports of electrical transformer laminations and cores made of non-North American” grain-oriented electrical steel (GOES), and as a result, if there is to be a tariff or quota on electrical transformers or the laminations and cores that are used in them, Mexico will not be subject to it.

Five Republican House members told Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in an Oct. 23 letter that the importation of electrical transformers and transformer cores is not a national security issue, and that the increase in imports of the goods from Canada and Mexico is a logical consequence of putting 25% tariffs on the steel used to make these goods. The letter, led by Rep. Denver Riggleman, R-Va., said that adding Section 232 tariffs could put 15,000 transformer industry jobs at risk. Riggleman was defeated in his primary. Reps. Benjamin Cline and Morgan Griffith, both of Virginia; Dan Bishop of North Carolina; and Bruce Westerman of Arkansas also signed.

The conclusion of whether imported blueberries are damaging domestic producers won't come until February, and it's not clear whether a Biden administration would impose tariff rate quotas or tariffs on blueberries from Mexico or Canada if the International Trade Commission recommends that an intervention is warranted.

The U.S.-Japan mini-deal is not consistent with World Trade Organization rules, a former White House trade negotiator said, so the two sides mentioned a future phase two deal to cover substantially all trade to convince Japan's parliament to pass the accord. Because of the way the deal was structured, with small tariff reductions for Japanese exporters, it did not require a vote in Congress, Clete Willems, speaking recently on a webinar for University of Nebraska students, said. In calling the mini-deal phase one, “I think both sides were playing it cute, to be honest,” Willems, now at Akin Gump, said. He said Japan was not interested in a comprehensive bilateral trade deal, because it still wants the U.S. to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

The U.S.-Japan mini-deal is not consistent with World Trade Organization rules, a former White House trade negotiator said, so the two sides mentioned a future phase two deal to cover substantially all trade to convince Japan's parliament to pass the accord. Because of the way the deal was structured, with small tariff reductions for Japanese exporters, it did not require a vote in Congress, Clete Willems, speaking recently on a webinar for University of Nebraska students, said. In calling the mini-deal phase one, “I think both sides were playing it cute, to be honest,” Willems, now at Akin Gump, said. He said Japan was not interested in a comprehensive bilateral trade deal, because it still wants the U.S. to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership.